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NOTES
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE:
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR A SEXUALLY
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment is "unsolicited nonreciprocal .. . [sexually based]
behavior that asserts a [worker's] sex role over [his or] her function as a
worker."' Sexual harassment involves unwelcome advances, statements
or conduct2 that unreasonably interfere with an individual's work per-
formance3 and ability to pursue a career.4 Because sexual harassment
may arise in a variety of situations,5 its judicial determination remains
very fact specific.
This Note discusses the problem of sexual harassment in the work-
place, with particular emphasis upon "hostile environment" harassment.
First, this Note examines the development of the sexual harassment
1. L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN 14-15 (1978). Sexual harassment is the most common
problem facing working women. Sexual Discrimination in the Workplace, 1981; Hearings Before
Senate Comm on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 518 (1981) (statement of
Karen Sauvigne, Program Director of the Working Women's Institute).
The majority of cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-08, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e(17) (1976), involve harassment of a female employee by a male supervisor
or co-worker. This cause of action is not limited to females and may be brought by male victims of
sexual harassment. See Huebschen v. Health & Social Servs. Dep't., 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.D. Wis.
1982), rev'd and remanded, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (male employee may assert claim for
sexual harassment by female supervisor). Acts of a homosexual supervisor may also lead to a finding
of discrimination. See Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (male
employee may assert cause of action for harassment by homosexual supervisor). Because females are
the most frequent victims of sexual harassment, however, this Note will use feminine gender in
discussing the victim of sexual harassment.
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1987) [herein-
after Guidelines]. See Note, The Dehumanizing Puzzle of Sexual Harassment: A Survey of the Law
Concerning Harassment of Women in the Workplace, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 577-80 (1985) [herein-
after Note, Sexual Harassment]. See also Linenberger, What Behavior Constitutes Sexual Harass-
ment?, 34 LAB. L.J. 238 (1983).
3. Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1604.11 (a)(3). The 1980 amendments substituted "unreasona-
bly" for the word "substantially" in § 1604.11(a)(3) to more accurately reflect the Commission's
intent. 45 FED. REG. 74,676 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604).
4. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DIs-
CRIMINATION 9-23 (1979). See also L. FARLEY, supra note I, at 45-51.
5. L. FARLEY, supra note I, at 15.
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cause of action under Title VII. Next, this Note considers the differing
standards of employer liability under the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission guidelines, federal case law and principles of agency
law. Finally, this Note recognizes the absence of a definite standard of
employer liability and proposes strategies to aid employers in avoiding
liability for sexual harassment.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 to abolish
artificial and discriminatory employment barriers7 erected against indi-
viduals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin.8 In
an attempt to defeat its passage, the prohibition against gender discrimi-
nation was added in the bill's eleventh hour.9 Congress adopted the
amendment with no hearing and little debate. 10 Consequently, until the
discussion of the 1972 amendments to Title VII," scant legislative his-
tory addressing the intended scope of the sexual discrimination prohibi-
tion existed.12
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) [hereinafter Title VII]. Title VII provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail dr refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
§ 2000e-2(a). See generally Note Sexual Harassment, supra note 2, at 580.
7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) See also, Comment, Title VIP Legal
Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53 WASH. L. REv. 123 (1977).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
9. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
10. 110 CONG. REC. 2582, 2584 (1964). For a discussion of the legislative history of Title VII,
see Kanowity, Sex-based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of
1963, 20 HASTINGS. L.J. 305, 310-13 (1968); Wells, Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 43 UMKC L.
REv. 273, 274-76 (1975).
11. "[D]iscrimination against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimi-
nation, .. . it is to be accorded the same degree of concern given to any type of similarly unlawful
conduct." S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971); "Such blatantly disparate treatment is
particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex discrimina-
tion since its enactment in 1964." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2140.
12. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Miller, Sex Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 882-83 (1967).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC), the regulatory agency responsible for public
enforcement of Title VII violations.13 Although Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of sex,14 it does not expressly define "sex dis-
crimination."' 5 As a result, courts permit the EEOC to formulate the
elements of the sex discrimination cause of action.1 6 The EEOC guide-
lines 7 specify that sexual harassment is a type of sex discrimination
under Title VII.'8 Thus, sexual harassment is now a component of the
Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination. 19
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
14. § 200e-2(a).
15. See supra note 6.
16. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 433-34.
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1-.11 (1987).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. "Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title
VII." § 1604.11(a). For a discussion of the EEOC's deliberation process, see 45 FED. REQ. 74,676-
77. See generally, Oneglia & Cornelius, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace" The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's New Guidelines, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 39 (1982); Note, New EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title
VII, 61 B.U.L. REv. 535 (1981) [hereinafter Note, EEOC Guidelines]. See also A. LARSON & L.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41.60 (1984).
19. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), remanded on other grounds,
sub nom., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (1978) (The first case to hold that sexual harassment
violates Title VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Sexual harassment is sex
discrimination).
A Title VII discrimination claim can proceed upon two different theories. The first, disparate
impact, was addressed by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See
generally Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination: A
Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1979); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972). Disparate impact
theory applies to discriminatory employment practices which adversely affect an entire protected
class. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1286 (1983) [hereinafter
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN]. For a discussion of the burden of proof in a disparate impact case, see
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra, at 1324-31. The disparate impact cause of action focuses on the effect
of the discriminatory policy. Note, Sexual Harassment, supra note 2, at 580-81. Most disparate
impact cases have concerned either written test or height and weight requirements. See, eg., Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (written test); Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (written
test and high school diploma); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) cert. denied, sub nom.
Contremos v. Los Angeles 455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (height and weight requirement).
The Supreme Court addressed the second theory, disparate treatment, in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See infra note 23. "'Disparate treatment'... is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." International Board of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). This theory focuses upon an employer's acts
which discriminate against a particular individual. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra, at 1286. Because
disparate treatment concerns individual discrimination, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory in-
tent. Id. at 1292 n. 31. In contrast, the disparate impact plaintiff need show only that the particular
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Courts have identified two distinct types of sexual harassment within
the disparate treatment discrimination theory.2" The first, quid pro quo
sexual harassment,21 occurs when an employer conditions continued em-
ployment upon an employee's submission to sexual demands. 2 The sec-
ond, "hostile environment" sexual harassment,23 occurs when sexual
comments or propositions are so pervasive that they create a hostile, in-
policy has a discriminatory effect. Id. at 1324. The disparate treatment approach, therefore, has the
higher burden of proof.
20. Both types of sexual harassment fall within the disparate treatment framework because they
involve discrimination against individuals.
21. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 4, at 32-40 (discussion of quid pro quo harassment); Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449,
1454 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Abusive Work Environment]. See also Attanasio, Equal Justice Under
Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual Harassment, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1982).
22. See, eg., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (employee fired for
refusing supervisor's sexual demands); Horn v. Duke Homes Div. of Windsor Mobil Homes, 755
F.2d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 1985) (employee transferred and later fired after refusing sexual advances).
Quid pro quo sexual harassment is structurally similar to other forms of Title VII discrimination
because it raises barriers to employment. Note, Abusive Work Environment, supra note 21, at 1454.
See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (plaintiff must prove
discriminatory reason for employment action). "[The plaintiff's supervisor created an artificial bar-
rier to employment which was placed before one gender and not the other, despite the fact that both
genders are similarly situated." Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.D.C. 1976) Because
of the similarity between quid pro quo harassment and other forms of Title VII discrimination, the
courts have analyzed quid pro quo harassment using the traditional disparate treatment discrimina-
tion framework of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Bryan, Sexual Harass-
ment as Unlawful Discrimination Under Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 14 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 25, 39 (1981). Establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment requires proof of: (1)
membership in a protected class; (2) application for ajob for which the individual is qualified and for
which the employer was accepting applications; (3) a rejection; and, finally (4) after rejection, the
position remaining vacant and the employer continuing to accept applications from other similarly
qualified applicants. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Although this test is flexible, the courts
have required slight modification for its application to the quid pro quo cause of action, Id. at n. 13.
See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, sub. nom. De Cinto
v. Westchester County Medical Center 108 S.Ct. 455 and 108 S.Ct. 89 (1987); Tompkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., 552 F.2d
1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Barnes v. Costle, held that the termination
of a female employee because she rejected the sexual advances of her male supervisor constitutes
unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 561 F.2d 983, 985, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Modifying the McDonnell Douglas test to better conform to the quid pro quo analysis, the Barnes
court required proof that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; the supervisor's conduct
was unwelcome, undesired or offensive; the harassment was based on sex; and the harassment tangi.
bly affected the employee's terms, compensation, condition or privileges of employment. 561 F.2d
93. Subsequent courts have not deviated from this standard of inquiry and these elements are no
longer in dispute.




timidating, or offensive working environment.24
A worker alleging hostile environment sexual harassment complains of
sexually abusive working conditions, rather than claiming denial of a spe-
cific job benefit through sexual harassment. 25 Although courts recog-
nized a cause of action under Title VII for ethnic, racial or religious
environmental harassment,26 they did not extend this cause of action to
sexual environmental harassment claims until 1981.27 In Bundy v. Jack-
son,2 8 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit first rec-
ognized that a harassing work environment alone could constitute sex
discrimination under Title VII. 29 The Bundy court said that continued
supervisory harassment of the plaintiff resulted in harassment becoming
the "standard operating procedure" in her department.30 Relying upon
24. Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1604.1 1(a)(3). See C. MAcKJNNON, supra note 4, at 32-47;
Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in The Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 879, 880 (1980).
25. Note, Abusive Work Environment, supra note 21, at 1455-56; Note, Sexual Harassment,
supra note 2, at 584-86. Because the disparate treatment test focuses upon the relationship between
specific illegal acts and some tangible job detriment, it is not easily adapted to a claim that the
workplace environment is itself discriminatory. Note, Abusive Work Environment, supra note 21, at
1453-63 (analyzing the difficulty of adapting disparate treatment theory to the hostile environment
cause of action).
26. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), was the
first case to hold that a discriminatory work environment violated Title VII. In Rogers, the plaintiff
successfully claimed that her employer's practice of providing discriminatory service to his Hispanic
customers created an offensive work environment for Hispanic employees. Id. at 238. The Rogers
court defined the phrase "term, conditions, or privileges of employment" (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l))
as "an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a work
environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination .. " 545 F.2d at 238. The courts
have extended this principle to include other types of harassment under Title VII. See, eg., Calcote
v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978) (racial harassment); Cariddi v. Kansas City
Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (national origin); Firefighters Institute for Racial
Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977) (race) cerL denied, sub nom. Banta v. U.S. 434
U.S. 819, and City of St. Louis v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424
F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religion and national origin).
27. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd,
568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3rd Cir. 1977) (initially, the district court held sexual harassment did not
constitute a cause of action under Title VII); Come v.Bausche & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Ariz. 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (no relief under Title VII);
Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7586 (E.D. Va. 1976), rev'd sub.
nom. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (district court dismissed
plaintiff's complaint in which she claimed she had been discharged for refusing sexual advances of
her supervisor).
28. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
29. Id. at 943-44.
30. Id. at 940. When Bundy complained to her harassers' supervisor, he summarily dismissed
her complaint and responded by propositioning her himself. Id.
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the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Rogers v. EEOC3 1 that a racially dis-
criminating environment violated Title VII,32 the court held that a sexu-
ally offensive environment also violated Title VII.33
In Henson v. City of Dundee,34 the Eleventh Circuit extended Bundy
and developed framework for analyzing environmental sexual harass-
ment claims." In Henson, a female police dispatcher was subjected to
repeated sexual inquiries, vulgar language and persistent requests for sex-
ual relations.36 The court held that "under certain circumstances the
creation of an offensive or hostile work environment due to sexual har-
assment can violate Title VII irrespective of whether the plaintiff suffers
tangible job detriment. '3 7
The Henson court modified the then-existing Title VII discrimination
test38 to reflect the differences inherent in hostile environmental discrimi-
nation.39 The court held: the prima facie case for environmental sexual
harassment requires proof of: (1) membership in a protected class; 40 (2)
unwelcome sexual behavior;41 (3) based on the employee's sex;42 (4) re-
31. 545 F.2d 234. For a discussion of Rogers, see supra note 26.
32. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
33. 641 F.2d at 945.
34. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 40-44.
36. 682 F.2d at 899.
37. Id. at 901.
38. See supra note 22.
39. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. See Note, Abusive Work Environ-
ment, supra note 21, at 1453-63.
40. 682 F.2d at 903. For a sex discrimination case, this merely requires that the employee
claim to be either a male or female. Id.
41. Id. See Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1604.11(a). Only "unwelcome" sexual behavior vio-
lates Title VII. "Whether the advances are unwelcome.., becomes an evidentiary question... for
the court ... to resolve." Note, EEOC Guidelines, supra note 18, at 561. For advances to be
unwelcome, the plaintiff must show that she neither invited nor encouraged them, and regarded
them as undesirable or offensive. Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
42. Hensen, 682 F.2d at 903. The plaintiff must show that but for her sex, the harassment
would not have occurred. Id. at 904. This can easily be shown when an employer directs his abuse
only at female employees and does not harass male employees. Id. This element will not be met,
however, when a bisexual employer makes advances to or engages in conduct equally offensive to
both male and female employees. Id.
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on gender, but does not apply to discrimination based on
sexual preference. Jommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). Therefore, an
employer's rule against hiring homosexuals does not violate Title VII. In addition, Title VII does
not apply to discrimination against transsexuals (members of one sex who believe that they are really
members of the opposite sex trapped in the wrong gender body). See Note, Denial of Title VII
Protection to Transsexuals: Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 553 (1984).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss1/8
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sults affecting a "term, condition or privilege" of employment;4 3 and, (5)
respondeat superior.44 Although courts uniformly apply the first four
elements, the fifth, employer liability, is a source of disagreement among
the courts and commentators.45
The Supreme Court first addressed hostile environment sexual harass-
ment in Meritor Saving Bank v. Vinson.46 In Meritor, the Court agreed
that sexually hostile or abusive work environments violate Title VII.4 7
The Court said that environmental sexual harassment occurs when "con-
duct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an indi-
vidual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment."48 The Court, however, realized that not
all harassing conduct is severe enough to affect a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment.4 9 Isolated incidents which merely offend an
employee may not sufficiently alter the work environment to violate Title
VII.50 The conduct "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment.' "51
Additionally, the Court placed a burden on the plaintiff to show that
her reaction to the harassment should have put her harasser on notice
that she found his conduct offensive.52 To the Court, uncompelled, vol-
untary participation does not lead to an inference that the employer's
actions were welcome.5 3 Instead, the focus of the inquiry is whether the
victim's conduct demonstrated that the harassing acts were "unwel-
43. 682 F.2d at 904. Psychological welfare is included as a "term, condition or privilege" of
employment. Rogers v. EEOC 454 F.2d at 238. The Rogers court also held, however, that the
"mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" does not
significantly affect the employment environment. Id.
44. 682 F.2d at 905. This element requires that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take remedial action. Id. This element has produced the most extensive
dispute and inconsistent application.
45. See, e.g., Note, Employment Discrimination - Defining an Employer's Liability Under Title
VII for On-The-Job Sexual Harassment: Adoption of a Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C.L. REV. 795
(1984) [hereinafter Note, Employment Discrimination]. See infra text accompanying notes 58-130.
46. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
47. Id. at 64. The Court extended the principles developed in earlier ethnic, racial, religious
and national origin environmental harassment cases. Id. See supra note 26.
48. 477 U.S. at 65. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
49. 477 U.S. at 67.
50. Id. (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d at 238; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 902).
51. 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2406 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). Consequently, future
cases will remain fact specific.
52. 477 U.S. at 68.
53, Id.
1988]
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come.""4 While determining whether an act is "unwelcome" is very fact
specific, this is consistent with the EEOC guidelines which emphasize
that sexual harassment should be analyzed in light of "the record as a
whole" and "the totality of circumstances." 5
Meritor established that unwelcome sexual advances or conduct suffi-
ciently pervasive to alter the victim's work environment will constitute
sex discrimination under Title VII.56 The Court, however, declined to
determine a standard for employer liability in sexual harassment cases."
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY
A. Guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The EEOC guidelines on employer liability distinguish among acts of
supervisors, 58 nonsupervisors59 and nonemployees. 6° The Commission
determines the supervisory or agency relationship to the employer by ex-
amining the employee's job function in the specific situation.61
54. Id.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b). In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harass-
ment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances,
such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.
The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, on a case-by-case
basis. Id.
56. 477 U.S. 57, 67-69. See supra text accompanying notes 43-55.
57. 477 U.S. at 72. "We therefore decline ... to issue a definitive rule on employer liabil-
ity .. " Id.
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1986) provides in pertinent part:
[ain employer.., is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employ-
ees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of
were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer
knew or should have known of their occurrence. The Commission will examine the cir-
cumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job functions performed by
the individual in determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency
capacity.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1985) provides in pertinent part: "With respect to conduct be-
tween fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace
where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the
conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action."
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1986) provides in pertinent part:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non employees, with respect to sexual
harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervi-
sory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate
and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider
the extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer
may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss1/8
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
1. Conduct of Supervisors.
Supervisory harassment is the most common type of sexual harass-
ment. Although courts have not applied one specific standard to deter-
mine employer liability for supervisory harassment,6" the EEOC
guidelines recommend strict liability.63 Under the guidelines, an em-
ployer is liable for any supervisory harassment regardless of policies for-
bidding such conduct, and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of the harassing conduct.'
2. Conduct of Non-Supervisory Employees
Under certain circumstances, an employer can be held liable for sexual
harassment by coworkers. 65 Because a co-worker does not have substan-
tial power over a fellow employee, the EEOC does not recommend strict
liability for the acts of non-supervisory employees. 66 Rather, the em-
ployer will only be held liable for harassing acts of coworkers when the
plaintiff proves that the employer knew or should have known of the
conduct. 67 Furthermore, some courts allow the defendant to defeat lia-
bility by showing that he took immediate corrective measures upon
learning of the harassment.68
3. Conduct of Non-Employees
An employer also may be held liable for sexual harassment from acts
of non-employees. 69 Under the guidelines, the employer will be held lia-
ble for the sexual harassment when he knows or should have known of
62. See infra text accompanying notes 72-113.
63. Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1604.11(c). See supra note 58.
64. Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1604.1 1(c). See also FED. REG. at 74,676 (strict liability is the
general standard of employer liability with respect to agents and supervisory employees).
65. See Allegretti, Sexual Harassment of Female Employees by Nonsupervisory Co-Workers: A
Theory of Liability, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 437, 445-60 (1981). A victim of sexual harassment
cannot sue a coworker under Title VII because a coworker is neither an "employer" or "agent of the
employer" nor a "respondent" under Title VII. See also Note, Sexual Harassment, supra note 2, at
591-92, 595-603.
66. See Note, Sexual Harassment, supra note 2, at 590. Because the coworker is not acting as
the employer's agent, the acts cannot be imputed to the employer through the principles of agency.
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). See supra note 59.
68. Id. See, eg., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Fekete v. United States
Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e). See supra note 60.
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the abusive conduct and fails to take immediate corrective action.70
Non-employee harassment claims are the least common claim.
B. Common Law Development of Employer Liability
Generally, courts have deferred to the EEOC guidelines concerning
employer liability for sexual harassment by non-supervisory employees
and non-employees. 71 The courts, however, have failed to settle on one
specific standard of employer liability for sexual harassment by supervi-
sory employees.72 Instead, three distinct standards have developed in the
lower federal courts.73 The first standard imposes strict liability for the
harassing acts of supervisors;74 the second requires proof of actual or
constructive knowledge;75 and the third adopts a bifurcated standard
which imposes strict liability for quid pro quo harassment and actual or
constructive knowledge for environmental harassment.76
Although the courts afford great deference to the EEOC guidelines,77
only one court has adopted the EEOC's strict liability standard for sex-
ual harassment by supervisory personnel.78 In Miller v. Bank of
America,79 the Ninth Circuit held the employer strictly liable for the
sexual demands of a supervisor despite the bank's expressed policy
70. Id. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally Note,
Sexual Harassment, supra note 2, at 592-93.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70. See also Note, Sexual Harassment, supra note 2,
at 589-93.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-114.
73. See Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 45.
74. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 77-82.
75. See Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977). See
infra text. accompanying notes 83-86.
76. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1983) (strict liability for quid pro quo
harassment but liability for environmental harassment only when the employer had actual or con-
structive knowledge and failed to take corrective action); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
910-12 (11th Cir. 1982) (employer liable for quid pro quo harassment regardless of lack of knowl-
edge while liability for environmental harassment requires knowledge plus lack of corrective re-
sponse). See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
77. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). The EEOC guidelines advocate a strict liability, In
general, however, agency guidelines are "not entitled to great weight" for new policy unsupported by
legislative history or prior judicial determination. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76
n. 11 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976).
78. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). Miller was decided before the
guidelines. Although Miller is a quid pro quo case, the court addressed the general issue of sexual
harassment. See Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 45, at 799.
79. 600 F.2d at 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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against sexual harassment and the existence of a formal grievance proce-
dure.8 ° The court premised a finding of employer liability on the doc-
trine of respondeat superior,81 even though it appears that the bank had
no knowledge of the supervisor's harassing acts.82
Most federal courts, however, have rejected strict liability in favor of
liability premised on proof of the employer's actual or constructive
knowledge.83 These courts indicate that actual knowledge exists when
management has been informed of the acts or has participated in the
harassing acts. 84 Constructive knowledge exists when the harassment is
so pervasive that the employer can be presumed to be aware of the situa-
tion.85 Commentators favoring this "knowledge standard" argue that
sexual harassment substantially differs from other types of employment
discrimination, and thus should be analyzed under a different standard of
liability.8 6
The third standard of employer liability developed in response to rec-
ognition of hostile environment sexual harassment combines strict liabil-
ity and knowledge tests to form a bifurcated standard.87 When applying
this bifurcated standard, courts distinguish between quid pro quo and
80. Id. at 213.
81. 600 F.2d at 213. "We conclude that respondeat superior does apply here, where the action
complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to
participate in or recommend such actions, even though what the supervisor is said to have done
violates company policy." Id.
82. The lack of employer knowledge is not stated in Miller, but subsequent courts assume that
the Ninth Circuit found no such knowledge. See Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 45,
at 799 (citing Barnes, 561 F.2d at 993 n.72.).
83. See Tompkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Meyers
v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Luddington v. Sambo's
Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Wisc. 1979); Heelan v. Johns-Manville, Inc., 451 F. Supp.
1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich.
1977),
84. See Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 45, at 803.
85. Id. See Tompkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d at 1048-49. See also
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 995 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
86. See Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 45, at 803. The concurring opinion in
Barnes supports use of a knowledge standard. This opinion lists three factors which theoretically
distinguish sexual harassment from other forms of Title VII discrimination, thus supporting a differ-
ent standard. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 998-1001 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). First, sexual harassment
is detected more easily by the empioyee than by the employer. Id. at 999. Second, the knowledge
standard effectively prohibits sexual harassment without encroaching upon its employees' private
lives. Id. at 1000. Finally, racial and ethnic comments are never socially acceptable, whereas in
most circumstances, sexual advances may constitute acceptable behavior. Id. at 1001.
87. Note, supra note 45, at 808. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir.
1982); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Cummings v. Walsh Const. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872
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hostile environment harassment88 . Because recent decisions recognize
the similarity of quid pro quo harassment to other forms of Title VII
discrimination, these courts apply strict liability.8 9 However, these
courts apply the constructive knowledge standard to hostile environmen-
tal sexual harassment because of the perceived inapplicability of strict
liability.90 Commentators argue that the bifurcated standard more accu-
rately tracks the realities of the two different forms of harassment and
therefore provides the most effective and fair enforcement of Title VII. 1
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,92 the Supreme Court declined to
determine a specific standard for employer liability.93 The EEOC, in an
amicus curiae brief, proposed that traditional principles of agency law
should determine the employer liability standard. 94 When examining
these agency principles, the EEOC concluded that in quid pro quo har-
assment, the supervisor's actions are "imputed to the employer whose
delegation of authority empowered the supervisor to take them."9 Thus,
the EEOC recommends strict liability for quid pro quo sexual
harassment.
On the other hand, the EEOC does not apply the agency doctrine of
respondeat superior to acts creating a hostile work environment. 96 In
environmental harassment cases, the EEOC prescribes an evaluation of
the availability and responsiveness of internal grievance procedures.97 If
the employee fails to utilize her employer's complaint procedure, then
the EEOC absolves the employer from liability, if the employer has not
otherwise obtained actual knowledge of the harassment. 9 Thus, the
EEOC holds employers liable for environmental harassment when they
(S.D. Ga. 1983); Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D.Del. 1983);
Conley v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 22-57. See Note, Employment Discrimination, supra
note 45, at 808.
89. See Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1985); Craig v. Y & Y
Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1983); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d at 255 n. 6; Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d at 910; Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213.
90. See supra note 86 (sexual harassment differs from other forms of employment discrimina-
tion and should be analyzed under a different standard of liability).
91. See Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 45, at 805-11.
92. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
93. Id. at 72.
94. Id. at 70-71.
95. Id. at 70.






learn of the harassment or when the victim has no reasonably accessible
process for lodging a complaint with appropriate management officials. 99
The EEOC distinguishes work environment harassment from quid pro
quo harassment because the supervisor is not "exercising or threatening
to exercise, actual or apparent authority to make personnel decisions af-
fecting the victim."' "°° The Meritor Court found the EEOC position in-
consistent with EEOC guidelines which advocate strict liability for the
acts of supervisors, 10° but reasoned that these guidelines require an ex-
amination of the circumstances particular to each individual case. t" z
The Court found that employers are not automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors.' °3 The Court stressed, however, that
this does not mean than an employer's lack of knowledge will excuse him
from liability."° Instead, the Court agreed with the EEOC's view that
Congress intended the courts to apply agency principles when determin-
ing employer liability. 0
Justice Marshall, addressed the employer liability standard issue in
the concurrence."°  Justice Marshall stated that environmental sexual.
harassment should be treated like all other causes of action under Title
VII.' °7 He therefore recommended that supervisory sexual harassment
which creates an offensive work environment be imputed to the employer
regardless of whether the employer had knowledge of the harassment. 1°8
Justice Marshall supported this conclusion by relying upon the direct
EEOC language in its 1980 amendment to the guidelines. 09 "[T]he
Commission and the courts have held for years that an employer is liable
if a supervisor or an agent violated Title VII, regardless of knowledge or
any other mitigating factor."' 10 Justice Marshall dismissed the Solicitor
General's statement that the creation of a hostile work environment is
99. Id.
100. Id. at 71.
101. Id. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c), supra note 58.
102. 477 U.S. at 71. See C.F.R. § 1604.11(c), supra note 58.
103. 477 U.S. 73.
104. Id. In addition, an employee's failure to use an existing policy and procedure will not
prevent employer liability. Id.
105. Id. at 72. This occurs because Title VII defines "employer" to include the employer's
"agent". 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
106. 477 U.S. at 74-78. Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens.
107. Id. at 78.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 74.
110. Id., (quoting 45 FED. Rao. 74,676 (1980)).
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beyond the scope of the agency. 1 Instead, because the agent is charged
with supervising and maintaining the work environment, the creation of
the work environment is included within his duties." 2 Therefore, he
said, abuse of the supervisor's power to maintain a productive work envi-
ronment should be analyzed no differently than abuse of the supervisor's
power to make personnel decisions.1" 3
IV. EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY
The Meritor majority indicated that future courts should look to
agency principles for guidance in determining employer liability under
Title VII.' " At common law, a master is liable for the torts of his ser-
vants acting within the scope of their employment,' '" but is not liable for
torts committed outside the scope of employment except in limited situa-
tions." 6 Generally, an employee is held to be a "servant" for the pur-
poses of the Restatement of Agency.' 17 The question of employer
liability will, therefore, center upon determining whether sexual harass-
ment falls within the "scope of employment."
The Restatement defines "scope of employment" in broad terms.11 8
111. 477 U.S. at 76-77.
112. Id.
113. Id. See also Note, Abusive Work Environment, supra note 21, at 1461.
114. See supra note 105.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957) provides:
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope
of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless,or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the exist-
ence of the agency relation.
117. Section 220 of the Second Restatement of Agency defines a servant as "a person employed
to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the
performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 220 (1957). See also § 220 Comment (g) (In general, "employee" and
"servant" are synonymous.).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957) provides:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not
expectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss1/8
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Conduct must be similar to conduct authorized by the master in order to
fall within the definition.119 The fact than an employee's acts are forbid-
den or illegal will not prevent them from falling within the scope of
employment.12 0
The determination of whether environmental sexual harassment falls
within the "scope of employment," therefore, will depend upon an inter-
pretation of the authority given the supervisor by his employer. Propo-
nents of a "knowledge" standard of liability will argue that a supervisor
is authorized only to make employment decisions, not to harass employ-
ees.' 21 In contrast, courts favoring a "strict liability" standard will focus
upon the supervisor's authority to maintain and promote a productive
working environment. 122 Because most courts have already adopted the
constructive knowledge requirement, 23 they are most likely to continue
this analysis by adapting constructive knowledge to fit within the agency
framework. Proponents of strict liability can counter this argument by
contending that even if the supervisor's acts did not fall within the scope
from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated
by a purpose to serve the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (1957) further defines conduct within the scope of
agency as follows:
§ 229. Kind of Conduct within Scope of Employment
(1) To be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general
nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized.
(2) In determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless
so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorizes as to be within the scope of employ-
ment, the following matters of fact are to be considered:
(a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants;
(b) the time, place and purpose of the act;
(c) the previous relations between the master and the servant;
(d) the extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between different
servants;
(e) whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the enter-
prise, has not been entrusted to any servant;
(f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done;
(g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized;
(h) whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been furnished by
the master to the servant;
(i) the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized re-
sult; and
(j) whether or not the act is seriously criminal.
119. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (1957).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 230-31 (1957).
121. This conduct would then fall outside the scope of employment, freeing the employer from
vicarious liability arising from the agency relationship.
122. Because the supervisor is authorized to maintain and promote a productive work environ-
ment, supervisory actions which impact on that environment are within the scope of agency.
123. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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of employment, the employer still should be held liable under an excep-
tion contained in § 219 of the Restatement.1 24 Under § 219, an employer
would be held liable for acts outside the scope of employment if the em-
ployee "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation." 125 This exception recognizes that "but for" the super-
visor's position as an agent, he could not harass the plaintiff.
Although most lower federal courts will probably continue to utilize
an actual or constructive knowledge standard, 126 it is difficult to predict
how the Supreme Court will eventually decide the employer liability is-
sue. The Meritor holding was closely decided, with five Justices declining
to reach the question" 7 and four Justices advocating strict liability. 28
As the composition of the Court changes, this balance could shift129 and,
in any event, Justices joining in the majority opinion could follow the
principles of agency to varying conclusions.13 0
V. EMPLOYER STRATEGY FOR AVOIDING LIABILITY
The absence of a definite standard of employer liability,13 1 combined
with the increased filing of charges of sexual harassment,1 32 creates
greater risk that an employer may face Title VII litigation. Therefore,
careful employers will adopt protective measures to insulate themselves
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d). See supra note 117. See also § 219
Comment (e) ("[Tihe servant may be able to cause harm because of his position as agent, as where a
telegraph operator sends false messages purporting to come form third persons... [or] the manager
of a store operated by him for an undisclosed principal is enabled to cheat the customers because of
his position.").
126. See supra note 87.
127. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor formed the
majority.
128. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined in the concurring opinion which
advocated strict liability.
129. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell were among the Justices who declined to reach the
issue. Now that they have retired, either of their successors could cast the deciding vote. Alterna-
tively, any of the three remaining Justices who originally declined to reach the issue could decide in
favor of strict liability.
130. The principles of agency can be interpreted to reach any conclusion falling within the range
from actual knowledge to strict liability. See supra text accompanying notes 117-126.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
132. "In 1985, 7,273 charges of discrimination alleging sexual harassment were filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission - nearly double the number filed just four years ear-
her." Vander Waerdt, Freeing Worker from Sexual Harassment, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 19,
1987, at 3B, col. 2.
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from potential liability.133
Employers who wish to avoid liability should adopt a comprehensive
policy prohibiting sexual harassment.134 This approach includes notify-
ing employees that sexual harassment is an intolerable prohibited em-
ployment practice.' 35 The employer's nondiscrimination policy must
address sexual harassment specifically, thereby alerting employees of the
employer's intent to prevent this form of discrimination.13 6 The policy
must be communicated effectively to employees.
Numerous methods of notifying employees about the policy exist. One
133. Hill & Behrens, Love in the Office: A Guide for Dealing With Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 30 DEPAUL L. REv. 581, 615 (1981). See Siniscalco,
Sexual Harassment and Employer Liability: The Flirtation That Could Cost a Fortune, 6 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 277, 289 (1980); Note, Sexual Harassment, supra note 2, at 609-14. The majority of
commentators on sexual harassment have suggested preventive measures to reduce risk of employer
liability. See also Martucci & Terry, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Legal Overview, 42 J.
Mo. B. 313, 318-19 (July-Aug. 1986); Wyatt, Avoiding Sexual Abuse Claims After Meritor, Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
134. "At a minimum, a good sexual harassment policy would (a) define and prohibit sexual
harassment, and (b) invite employees who believe they have been the victims of sexual harassment to
come forward and express their complaints to management." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN supra note 19,
at 429 (footnote omitted).
Any adopted policy should be tailored to meet any peculiarities of state law and the particular
needs of the employer. One representative policy from a California employer is as follows:
REAFFIRMATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY CONCERNING
SEX DISCRIMINATION
It is the policy of the Company that there be no discrimination against any employee or
applicant on the basis of sex. In keeping with that policy, the Company will not tolerate
sexual harassment by any of its employees.
Sexual harassment is a violation of the Company's Rules of Conduct. Unwelcome sex-
ual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature constitute sexual harassment when:
-Submission to the conduct is made either explicit or implicit condition of employment;
-Submission to or rejection of the conduct is used as the basis for an employment decision
affecting the harassed employee; or
-The harassment substantially interferes with an employee's work performance or creates
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.
Any employee or applicant that feels he or she has been discriminated against due to his
or her sex should report such incidents to his or her supervisor, Personnel, or any member
of management, without fear of reprisal. Confidentiality will be maintained.
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the totality of the
circumstances, the nature of the harassment, and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred will be investigated. The Personnel Department has the responsibility of investi-
gating and resolving complaints of sexual harassment.
The company considers sexual harassment to be a major offense which can result in the
suspension or discharge of the offender.
Id. at 429, n. 265. See also S. SHAW & B. HARRISON, AVOIDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CHARGES, Form 2 (1986).
135. Hill & Behrens, supra note 133, at 617.
136. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 71.
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method is posting notices that sexual harassment is a form of discrimina-
tion under Title VII. 137 Furthermore, an employer may publish its pol-
icy in an employee newsletter. Also, the employer should educate its
supervisory personnel about sexual harassment through staff meetings or
training-programs. 131 In addition, an employer can incorporate the pol-
icy into existing operating procedures. One employer utilizes its employ-
ees' pay envelopes to distribute reminders that sexual harassment is
illegal and employees have the right to complain.
139
Another facet of the policy is institution of a grievance procedure to
facilitate complaints about sexual harassment. 1" To maximize effective-
ness, the procedure should designate an independent party other than the
victim's supervisor as the first link in the complaint process. The availa-
bility of a third party will encourage victims of supervisory harassment to
use the grievance procedure. In addition, because female employees are
the most common victims of sexual harassment, the grievance procedure
should allow women to register their complaints with another female
employee.
Although a harassed employee need not exhaust the internal grievance
procedure prior to bringing suit under Title VII, 1"1 a finding that the
employee failed to follow a properly structured procedure may imply
that the conduct was not "unwelcome." The existence of an effective
grievance procedure and policy against discrimination, however, will not
necessarily shield the employer from liability.142 Instead, the courts will
look to the totality of the circumstances, 4 3 including the employer's ap-
137. A statement that the courts have consistently declared that Title VII prohibits racial, eth-
nic, religious, or sexual harassment should suffice to put employees on notice. Hill & Behrens, supra
note 133, at 618.
138. At staff meetings, the supervisory personnel should be informed that if they refrain from
sexual harassment and if they can prevent sexual harassment by other employees, they will have
effectively reduced the risk of employer liability. Waks & Starr, Sexual Harassment in the Work-
place: The Scope of Employer Liability, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 369, 385 (1981).
139. Lublin, Resisting Advances, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1981, at 1, col. 1 (discussing action by
Chicago Transit Authority).
140. One procedure suggested by March Faucher and Kenneth McCulloch provides a separate
grievance format for filing, investigating and resolving a sexual harassment case. Faucher & McCul-
loch, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace - What Should the Employer Do?, 5 EEO Today 38, 38-
46 (1978), reprinted in Hill & Behrens, supra note 133, at 619 n.188.
141. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
142. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986). The Court held that the em-
ployer's nondiscrimination policy did not address sexual harassment and the grievance procedure
required the employee to direct her complaint to the supervisor responsible for the harassment.




parent willingness to comply with Title VII. By adopting a comprehen-
sive policy against sexual harassment employers decrease the risk of Title
VII litigation and decrease the possibility of liability should litigation
arise.
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment is a pervasive form of discrimination which creates
a severe detriment to working women and to our entire society. This
societal barrier must be removed from the workplace so that all employ-
ees can compete effectively and productively. In the absence of a clear
standard of employer liability, employers face uncertainty. By far, the
best way for employers to avoid liability for sexual harassment is to pre-
vent the harassment from occurring. Employers, therefore, should adopt
stringent policies prohibiting sexual harassment. They should provide an
effective grievance procedure which circumvents the victim's immediate
supervisor and provides contact with a employer-liaison of the victim's
own gender. Finally, the employer should actively enforce its nondis-
crimination policy. An employer who follows the above course of action
decreases the likelihood of liability, increases worker satisfaction and
productivity, and protects employees from sexual harassment.
Lisa A. Blanchard
F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (3rd Cir. 1977); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
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